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DOLLARIZATION IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES4
... citizens of homeland keep saving dollars issued in
the USA. And neither defaults with devaluations nor
banking crises affect citizens' love for the best prod-
uct of the U.S. paper industry. Quite the contrary —
this love becomes even stronger.
"Izvestiya", March 15, 2000
Extending the Thomas paper to an environment
where there are goods and capital markets imperfec-
tions would be one way of yielding an appropriate
empirical specification on which to base tests of the
importance of CS in LDCs.
John Caddington, 1989
NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
A nation's currency is a key element of the independent monetary policy
of that country. However, authorities can not force citizens to regard the
currency they offer as the only money. In the 1990s, transition econo-
mies lifted restrictions on foreign currency holdings. At the same time,
most countries underwent a prolonged period of macroeconomic insta-
bility. Partial dollarization of the countries in the region has been one of
the consequences. In particular, households use the US dollar and euro
(earlier — deutsche mark) for savings, for price setting and for payments
for certain goods and services.
Traditionally, sharp devaluation of the national currency and related infla-
tion are viewed as the main reason for dollarization. The nation's "own"
money loses value so fast that people start looking for substitutes. These
could be some goods and precious metals, but the most common substi-
tute is the more stable currencies of other countries. In other words, when
the purchasing power of the domestic money falls relative to foreign
money, the share of foreign money in financial flows tends to increase.
This theoretical hypothesis has been tested and supported many times
for many developing and transition countries. On individual countries, ex-
amples of other hypotheses regarding the factors of dollarization were
tested. Often these hypotheses were not based on a theoretical basis.
In this paper I try to reveal one more common factor of dollarization for
different countries — inflation volatility. Theoretically the link between
dollarization and inflation volatility follows from Thomas' model. Accord-
ing to the model, with perfect financial markets and high international
capital mobility, the level of dollarization depends on relative returns on
assets in different currencies, return volatility (risk), and attitude to risk.
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The source of risk in the model is price volatility in the country and
abroad.
To test this hypothesis, I used data on 9 transition economies: 4 post-
Soviet republics — Ukraine, Russia, Latvia, and Lithuania; and 5 post-
socialist countries — Poland, Czech Republic, Romania, Slovenia, and
Croatia. Taking into consideration that most of the countries' financial
markets are poorly developed, I tried to account for different indicators
of financial market development.
The most important conclusions of the empirical analysis are the following.
Relative returns on assets (deposits in different currencies) and inflation
volatility are linked to dollarization in transition economies. Economic
agents' choice of assets depends on their attractiveness (their return
and risk characteristics). It is interesting that this result holds for coun-
tries with different monetary regimes: from a currency board (Lithuania)
to direct inflation targeting (Czech Republic and Poland).
The estimation results imply that there is the potential to fight dollariza-
tion through the use of macroeconomic instruments such as high do-
mestic interest rates, a predictable exchange rate, and a stable inflation
rate. Targeting high interest rates is not a preferred instrument of eco-
nomic (monetary) policy since high interest rates restrain the real econ-
omy. Predictability of the exchange rate and stability of the inflation rate
can imply tradeoffs. For instance, keeping the exchange rate stable quite
likely may result in higher inflation rate volatility. Therefore, inflation tar-
geting seems to be a preferred instrument. In this case, possible ex-
change rate fluctuations could have no adverse effects on the relative
return if financial markets are developed and interest rates reflect ex-
change rate dynamics and expectations.
The dollarization level in transition economies is not fully independent of
foreign exchange flows as a means of payments. This statement is sup-
ported by the dependence of dollarization on the external trade balance.
This relationship may indicate the relative underdevelopment of financial
markets, because households and firms can not compensate external
trade flows by means of financial instruments. Measures encouraging the
development of financial intermediation and increasing its efficiency will
contribute to weakening this relationship. However, I failed to find a sta-
tistically significant relationship between other indicators of financial
market development and dollarization.
Dollarization in transition economies is quite inert. The long-run effects of
dollarization determinants exceed the original short-run effects by a sub-
stantial factor, thus it is vain to expect immediate positive effects of the
policies targeted at reducing the dollarization level in the country.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The term dollarization is used to refer to the situation when residents of
the country hold a share of their assets in the form of foreign currency
and foreign currency denominated assets.1 Dollarization consists of both
currency substitution, when foreign currency is used for payments, and
asset substitution, when foreign currency becomes mainly the means to
store value. In the early 90s when the majority of post-socialist countries
lifted restrictions on foreign currency holdings, they soon became sig-
nificantly dollarized.
Among the reasons for fast growth in dollarization levels are asset diver-
sification, an unstable macroeconomic environment, in particular, high
levels of inflation and devaluation when national currencies cease to fully
function as money, and undeveloped capital markets that provided no
means for households and enterprises to invest savings. In this situation,
the U.S. dollar and/or German mark and/or Russian ruble2 made it pos-
sible to more efficiently perform transactions and store value, thus con-
tributing to the welfare of private economic agents.
From the macroeconomic policy perspective, however, the existence of
dollarization makes it more difficult for authorities to implement their
goals. First, budget deficit financing, all other things being equal, be-
comes more inflationary because foreign currency replaces the national
currency. As a result, covering the fiscal gap requires a higher monetary
base growth. Second, the probability of a banking crisis increases pro-
vided there is a mismatch of assets and liabilities as well as a lower abil-
ity to pay off foreign currency borrowers, part of whose income is gener-
ated on the internal market. Third, the structure of dollarization —
                                               
1 An alternative definition of dollarization is legislative introduction of a foreign
currency as the official domestic currency. Following Calvo (1999), this phenome-
non was called "complete" dollarization, which is different than the "partial" dol-
larization phenomenon referred to in this project. It is worth noting, however, that
the political decision to implement complete dollarization is usually a consequence
of the cost-benefit analysis of existing partial dollarization. The very term "dollari-
zation" has become a common name and doesn't necessarily mean that the for-
eign currency used is U.S. dollars. It emerged when the observed phenomenon
was actively analyzed in Latin America, where the dollar really was circulating as a
parallel currency.
2 Russian national currency is used as a foreign (parallel) currency in other post-
Soviet transition countries although Russia itself is considered to have a signifi-
cantly dollarized economy.
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whether it represents more currency or asset substitution — makes more
difficult the choice of an exchange rate regime and monetary aggregate
as an operating goal of monetary policy. In general, the existence of
dollarization makes the macroeconomic environment more risky.
The objectives of this paper are as follows: first, to test whether relative
returns on assets, inflation volatility and financial market development
are factors of dollarization in transition economies; second, to determine
the implications of policies minimizing the negative effects of dollariza-
tion.
In the Thomas' portfolio balance model (1985), the level of dollarization
depends on relative returns on assets, risks of assets and attitudes to-
wards risk. My hypothesis is that the level of dollarization is negatively
correlated with the development of domestic financial markets. Stylized
facts described by Calvo and Vegh (1992) and Balino et al. (1999) pro-
vide evidence that the process of dollarization begins with substituting
the function of money as a means of storing value, then — as a unit of
account, and finally — as a medium of exchange (means of payment). It
is assumed that in transition countries, in contrast to Latin American
countries, dollarization has not widely reached the stage of currency
substitution and represents mostly asset substitution. At the beginning of
the transition period well-organized capital markets did not exist; that is
why foreign currency became perhaps the only instrument to store value,
and even presently remains one of the major instruments. At the same
time, due to undeveloped financial markets, transaction motives (in par-
ticular, those related to external trade) significantly affect foreign cur-
rency portfolios of enterprises and households.
In this paper I test the following hypothesis, implied in Thomas' model,
using panel data on 9 transition economies: the level of dollarization is
determined by rate of returns and riskiness of assets denominated in na-
tional and foreign currencies, and attitudes towards risk. In addition, I
test the relationship between the level of dollarization and financial mar-
ket development.
The results of the empirical estimation of Thomas' model, augmented by
financial market development indicators, allows me to make the following
conclusions. First, relative returns on assets and inflation volatility are
significant factors of dollarization in transition economies. This tentatively
implies that high domestic interest rates, predictable exchange rates,
and stability of inflation (not necessarily reduction of its level) might help
"fight" dollarization. Second, the dollarization level in transition econo-
mies is not completely independent of transaction motives that are im-
plied from its relationship with the external trade balance.
DOLLARIZATION IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES8
2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
The literature on dollarization (currency substitution) is very multifarious.
Theoretical models are based on different paradigms; empirical evidence
based on the use of heterogeneous data and specifications often include
ad hoc variables not included explicitly in theoretical models. Still, there
is no consensus even concerning the definition of this phenomenon.3
The phenomenon of dollarization (currency substitution) has been stud-
ied since the 70s, and until recently research was concentrated mainly
on developing countries of Latin America, where this phenomenon be-
came the most significant.
In my opinion, there are three generations of dollarization (currency sub-
stitution) models. Early models (Calvo and Rodriguez, 1977; Leviatan,
1981) could not distinguish between the motives of currency and asset
substitution because they assumed a choice from two assets only: do-
mestic and foreign currency (that was a reasonable assumption at the
time, because capital mobility was quite restricted). Residents maximize
their real financial wealth w in a foreign currency:
W = M/E + M*, (1)
where M is domestic money, M* is foreign money, and E is the nominal
exchange rate.
The next generation of models — asset portfolio balance models — ex-
plicitly assumed the existence of bonds denominated in each currency.
Demand for each asset, as defined by Branson and Henderson (1985),
and Cuddington (1983),4 is a function of real income and real return on
each asset. In empirical studies usually only the domestic money de-
mand function is estimated. For instance, Cuddington (1983) estimates
                                               
3 The most often cited survey articles are Calvo and Vegh (1992), Giovanini and
Turtelboom (1994), Mizen and Pentecost (1996). In this paper I follow Calvo and
Vegh (1992) and (1996), defining currency substitution as a replacement of the
medium of the exchange function of domestic money, while dollarization includes
replacing the medium of exchange, unit of account and store of value functions.
4 Other versions of the portfolio balance model are worth mentioning. In the se-
quential portfolio balance model (Miles, 1978), economic agents first choose the
optimal portfolio of monetary and non-monetary assets and then decide on the
structure of monetary assets. In the dynamic optimization model, Bufman and Lei-
derman (1993) use orthogonality restrictions that follow from first order conditions
including money in the utility function. Mizen and Pentecost (1996) refer to these
models as "restricted portfolio balance," while Branson and Henderson (1985)
call them "unrestricted portfolio balance."
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the following specification:
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where r — return on domestic bonds, õ — depreciation rate of a domes-
tic currency, +*r x  — return on foreign bonds, ó — real income. A sig-
nificant coefficient η4 indicates the existence of currency substitution,
while coefficient η2  indicates asset substitution.
The third generation of models — balance sheet models — consider dol-
larization from two sides of the financial intermediary (banks). In the
model of Ize and Levy–Yeyati (1998), equilibrium dollarization fluctuates
around the level of dollarization at which the whole portfolio has the
minimum variance. Minimum variance of a portfolio's dollarization λ*
equals
π πλ
π π
+
=
+ + +
* ( ) ( , )
( ) ( ) 2 ( , )
V Cov s
V V s Cov s
, (3)
where π — domestic inflation rate, à s — rate of the real exchange rate
depreciation. From (3) it follows that the minimum variance of a portfo-
lio's dollarization increases with inflation volatility, and decreases with the
volatility of the real exchange rate. According to the model, equilibrium
dollarization deviates from the minimum variance of a portfolio's dollari-
zation in the presence of asymmetries between depositors' and borrow-
ers' portfolios. These asymmetries arise when cross-border deposits are
not matched by external loans, when the currency composition of bank
reserves deviates from the minimum variance portfolio, and when finan-
cial intermediation in domestic and foreign currency is taxed at different
rates. The model implies that an increase in depreciation expectations
does not, by itself (unless agents revise their expectations of inflation
and real exchange rate volatility), induce more dollarization and is only
reflected in an increase in the internal interest rate differential. An im-
portant assumption of this model is the absence of foreign currency in
circulation among assets.
This project is based on Thomas' (1985) theoretical model, which is con-
sidered as a second generation model. An investor chooses the quantity
of domestic and foreign currency, taking into account transaction costs
and interest rates, and then borrows and lends in each currency in order
to optimize his or her currency portfolio. The model shows that currency
substitution depends on nominal interest rates, while dollarization (cur-
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rency substitution plus asset substitution) depends on the real return
differential, assets' risk characteristics, and attitude to risk.
In my opinion, the model has the following advantages. First, in Thomas'
model, the difference between currency and asset substitution is most
clearly highlighted. For comparison, the model of Ize and Levy–Yeyati
lacks this feature, as foreign currency in circulation is assumed not to
exist, and their analysis is concentrated only on asset substitution.
Second, unlike balance sheet models, an estimation of Thomas' model
does not require data on the currency structure of bank loans and re-
serves, information that usually is not published.
Third, there are few empirical tests of Thomas' model. Korhonen (1996)
and Piontkivsky (2000) made an attempt to estimate Thomas' model
empirically from data on transition economies. Korhonen (1996) tests the
relationship between the dollarization level in Lithuania and the interest
rate differential, and expected devaluation separately, while Piontkivsky
(2000) tests the relationship between Ukrainian dollarization and the dif-
ference of real returns on domestic and foreign assets (where the inter-
est rate differential and expected devaluation are combined into one
variable). Both studies generally support the tested hypotheses, though
Korhonen (1996) gets an insignificant coefficient of expected deprecia-
tion.
The key elements of the mentioned empirical studies are explicit or im-
plicit assumptions of the constant risk of assets, and invariable attitudes
to risk. If the latter seems to be more realistic, the former could appear
to be too restrictive. It is a challenge to examine a more general version
of Thomas' model by relaxing the assumption of constant risk of assets.
The disadvantage of applying Thomas' model to the analysis of transition
economies is its assumption of perfect financial markets, where eco-
nomic agents can borrow and lend on both domestic and international
markets without constraints. This project tries to explicitly account for the
impact of undeveloped capital markets on dollarization.
Undeveloped financial markets are mentioned in the literature as a
cause of dollarization. Balino et al. (1999, 3, 24) stress that "dollariza-
tion reflects the absence of macroeconomic stability and the existence
of distortions in financial markets" and recommends that "to limit dol-
larization, authorities may promote alternative financial instruments
such as stocks, mutual fund shares, corporate finance bonds, and as-
set-backed securities". Mongardini and Mueller (1999, 21) claim that
dollarization is "often driven also by the lack or thinness of markets for
medium- and long-term securities denominated in the domestic cur-
rency" and in order to reduce dollarization, it is necessary "to pursue a
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deepening of financial assets by lengthening the maturity of domestic
securities, especially government bonds." Vetlov (2001) mentions the
depth of the domestic financial market as one of the institutional de-
terminants of dollarization. However, this idea is presented most pre-
cisely by Savastano (1996, 226):
"The relative importance of foreign currency as an in-
flation hedge will be inversely related to the econ-
omy's level of financial development. An economy
with a well-developed financial market is, in principle,
capable of adapting rapidly to a high-inflation envi-
ronment by offering a rich set of fairly liquid, high-
yield instruments denominated in domestic currency
('near monies') that preserve the real value of the
public's portfolio. In contrast, a 'financially repressed'
economy undergoing high inflation generally offers
domestic residents few options other than to seek
protection in foreign-currency-denominated assets
and instruments."
Literature on dollarization in transition economies develops also in other
directions, although several years ago there were only a few studies on
transition economies. The only survey article is by Sahay and Vegh
(1995), who, in addition to providing a theoretical model, describe dol-
larization trends but provide no empirical estimations. Van Aarle and
Budina (1995) estimate the currency substitution effect on seigniorage in
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
Recently more and more researchers have expressed interest in this
topic, and one possible reason for this is that dollarization is quite wide-
spread in the region, and it is perceived to have a significant influence
on economic activity and therefore economic policy. As a rule, authors
test existing theoretical models using new data sets or look for dollariza-
tion determinants through the development of ad hoc models. Muller and
Mongardini (1999) test the existence of hysteresis in Kyrgyzstan by in-
cluding a ratchet-variable, i.e., whether the current level of currency
substitution depends on a previously observed maximum value. Sarayevs
(2000) conducts econometric analysis of dollarization in Latvia, while
Vetlov (2001) analyzes dollarization in Lithuania. Friedman and Verbetsky
(2001) test the dynamic optimization model with money-in-the-utility-
function on Russian data, while Shinkevich (2001) explains the high lev-
els of dollarization in Russia and its hysteresis by the existence of net-
work effects in demand for foreign exchange. Heimonen (2001) focuses
on competition and the trade-off between the dollar and euro in currency
substitution in Estonia.
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3. MODEL SPECIFICATION AND ESTIMATION RESULTS
3.1. Theory and Model Specification
To determine the major factors of dollarization, we use Thomas' model
(Thomas, 1985). A representative domestic consumer maximizes his or
her expected utility by choosing real consumption level c and asset
portfolio structure
( ) ( )β β∞
=
∈∑
0
, 0,1t t
t
u c , (4)
where ( )tu c  — convex and increasing (von Neumann–Morgenstern
function). The consumer chooses between 4 assets: domestic currency
m, foreign currency f, domestic bonds d and foreign bonds b.5 If
θ =( , , , )j j m f b d
is an asset's weight in consumer's wealth, then
θ θ ++ = =
+ + +f b
f b
DR
f m b d
shows the dollarization level.
The consumer holds part of his or her assets in cash only because of its
high liquidity. Domestic and foreign real money balances m and f reduce
transaction costs presented as follows:
 
=   
≥ ≤ ≤ > > > − >21, 2 11 22 12 22 12
, ,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,vv
m f
s cv
c c
v v v v v v v v v
, (5)
where s — shopping time. Additional real money balances yield positive
though decreasing transaction cost reduction. Both money balances and
bonds are imperfect substitutes.6
Thomas (1985) uses results from the continuous time portfolio allocation
                                               
5 Here by bonds we mean any interest-bearing asset that does not provide liquid-
ity services.
6 Only in this case currency substitution may appear. If currencies are perfect
substitutes, exchange rate indeterminacy results (see Kareken and Wallace,
1981).
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model to derive the following first order conditions:
 
− =  1 ,
m f
v i
c c
, (6)
∗ 
− =  2 ,
m f
v i
c c
, (7)
θ θ − −+ = +
+ − − + −
* 2 *
*2 2 * 2 * *2 *( )( 2 ) ( ) ( )f b
R R S SS
A V S S SS S SS S SS
, (8)
where ∗i and i nominal foreign and domestic interest rate,
−
*R R  — difference of real returns on foreign and domestic bonds;
S  and *S — domestic and foreign prices' (instantaneous) standard de-
viations ( *SS —the covariance between them, 2S  and *2S — variances);
Α( )V —Arrow–Pratt measure of relative risk aversion.
As Vegh (1989) shows, (6) and (7) imply that the relative demand for
money is determined by nominal interest rates ∗i and i. The consumer
keeps accumulating money assets until the cost of additional transaction
services equals the cost of holding money (i.e., nominal interest rate).
Equation (8) shows that allowing for assets substitution (not only cur-
rency substitution), the optimal choice of the consumer will depend on
the real return differential, relative return variance (risk) and attitude to
risk.7 As (8) implies, the optimal choice of the share of foreign currency
denominated assets consists of a "speculative" component (the first
item in (8)), and a "hedging" component (the second item), minimizing
the risk of the portfolio's purchasing power. The source of risk in the
model is price volatility in the country and abroad. As Thomas (1985,
351) pointed out, the "final structure of [the] net asset portfolio is inde-
pendent on money demand".
In this project I suggest two approaches to the empirical specification, to
be used to estimate Thomas' model. The first approach considers spe-
                                               
7 Sahay and Vegh (1996) illustrate the difference between asset and currency
substitution concepts with the following example. Assume the domestic nominal
interest rate and speed of devaluation decrease by an equal amount. The real re-
turn differential does not change, therefore the dollarization level remains the
same. Because the interest rate ratio changes, the structure of dollarization
changes — a consumer holds less foreign currency, i.e., currency substitution di-
minishes.
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cial case (8), in which foreign prices are constant: *2S =0. Therefore,
*SS =0 and + −*2 2 *( 2 )S S SS = 2S . Let
+− − = − + =
* *
1( ) ( )
e
t t t t tR R i i e RR
8
— "net" relative return on domestic bonds. Then
2 2
1 1
( )( ) ( )( )
t t
t t
tt
RR RR
DR DR
A V S A V S
−
= + ⇒ − = . (9)
In the case of stable foreign prices, the "hedging" component of a con-
sumer's choice assumes holding all assets in a foreign currency (unity in
(9)), and only a higher return on assets in the national currency adds to
the "speculative" motive of the consumer to invest assets in the national
currency. Thus, the equation to be estimated is as follows:
β β⇒ − = − + + +21 2log(1 ) log( ( )) log( ) log( )it i it it itDR A V RR S u . (10)
From this it follows that β β= − =1 2 1. In addition, (10) does not allow for
a negative relative return on assets in the national currency. We expect
that an increase in the relative return on assets in the national currency
increases its share in the portfolio, while an increase in inflation volatility
reduces it.
The second approach considers a general case, the idea of which is to
find a linear approximation of (8) — the level of dollarization as a function
of relative return and inflation volatility — relaxing the restriction of price
stability abroad. Assume that foreign prices change extemporaneously
but its variance is constant. In this case simplifications (9)–(10) are im-
possible, and we have no well-defined specification following from the
theoretical model. At the same time, the assumption of non-constant
prices abroad is more realistic.
=
2( ( ) , , )it i it itDR f A V RR S . (11)
Thomas thought that his model was applicable to countries with open fi-
nancial markets and high (international) capital mobility. In my opinion,
this model is also applicable to transition countries if by capital mobility
                                               
8 Strictly speaking, this formula is based on the assumption of (relative) purchas-
ing power parity π π= + *e , where π * and π — inflation rates at home and abroad,
e — devaluation rate of domestic currency.
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we mean "internal/domestic" capital mobility — the possibility of free
cross-flow between assets denominated in different currencies inside the
country.
At the same time, we differentiate two groups of institutional factors
which have a significant effect on the dollarization dynamics in transition
economies: the existence of the "shadow" (unofficial) sector of the
economy and relatively undeveloped financial markets. For servicing the
"shadow" economy, economic agents actively use cash in foreign de-
nominations. Such use of foreign currency could have a motive other
than its return and riskiness, because these motives are dictated by the
desire to keep financial operations off the official accounts. Since ad-
ministrative authorities do not have full control over foreign currency cir-
culation, foreign cash supports the functioning of the unofficial sector of
the economy.
According to my hypothesis, the extent of financial market development
affects the dollarization level through the following channels:
• Change of domestic asset portfolio risk characteristics. Let d consist
of the set of assets n (mainly, bank deposits). As n increases —
emergence of enterprises' stocks and bonds as well as government
bonds — opportunities for domestic portfolio diversification increase.
Then, in accordance with the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)
(e.g., Berndt, 1991), in the case of equal real returns variance of do-
mestic portfolio decreases, and therefore, risk decreases;
• Banking system effectiveness: If banks offer new instruments allowing
its clients to hedge off inflation and/or devaluation (i.e., indexed de-
posits) or banking instruments become more flexible, then inflation
volatility becomes less damaging, therefore, dollarization decreases;
• Because of limited opportunities to borrow, currency substitution and
dollarization are not fully independent. That is why dollarization can
depend on the external trade balance or current account balance
since economic agents can not compensate for trade flows using fi-
nancial instruments. For instance, when the trade balance is in sur-
plus, there is a net foreign currency inflow into the country. Under
conditions of developed financial markets, exporters could convert
these monies into national currency to deposit them with local banks
or to invest into securities or other instruments. Since their choice is
limited and the secondary market is thin, the structure of exporters'
portfolios depends on primary foreign currency inflow.
Therefore, in my opinion, inclusion of variables reflecting financial market
development into specifications (10) and (11) could improve the ex-
planatory power of the model.
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3.2. Data
I use quarterly data for 9 transition economies — Ukraine, Russia, Po-
land, Czech Republic, Romania, Slovenia, Croatia, Latvia, and Lithuania.9
Most of the data comes from IMF publication International Financial Sta-
tistics (IFS). The time series endpoints are 4Q2001, while the length of
the series is conditioned on the beginning of their publication for each
country in the sample (from the beginning of 1991 to the end of 1994).
Uniform methodology of data composition allows cross-country compari-
sons. Fig. 1 shows dollarization dynamics in the sample countries.
                                               
9 Foreign currency deposits are available in International Financial Statistics only
for 6 transition economies — Ukraine, Russia, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic,
Romania, and Albania. This fact limits our sample. Albania was excluded due to
political instability as was the Slovak Republic because of its particular features of
foreign currency regulation. Poland, Slovenia, Croatia, Latvia and Lithuania were
added to the sample because the data on foreign currency deposits at commer-
cial banks were available from the web-sites of these countries' Central Banks.
The source of data on interest rates on national currency deposits in Romania is
the website of Central Bank of Romania.
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Fig. 1. Dynamics of the Dollarization Level in the Sample Countries.
Source: IFS, Central Banks of Poland, Slovenia, Croatia, Latvia, and Lithuania.
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The main problem with the data is the choice of the dollarization indica-
tor. Theoretically, it should include the sum of foreign currency deposits,
foreign currency in circulation, and foreign currency deposits of resi-
dents abroad (Balino, 1999), excluding deposits of non-residents in the
country (Sahay and Vegh, 1996). I assume that the latter component is
insignificant.
Taking into account the problem with statistics on foreign currency in
circulation, I approximate the dollarization level ( itDR ) by the ratio of the
sum of foreign currency deposits in the country to the total volume of
deposits (including those in the domestic currency),10 that is
=
+
b
DR
b d
.
We can view this indicator as more appropriate compared to the ratio of
foreign currency deposits to broad money
=
+ +
b
DR
m b d
,
since the effect of the shadow economy in the latter is reflected only in
the denominator through national currency (cash) in circulation.
It is reasonable to assume that in the case of Ukraine, and especially
Russia, omitting foreign currency in circulation from the dollarization ratio
may seriously distort the series. That is why for these countries, I try to
account for foreign currency in circulation on the basis of accessible
data.11 The dollarization indicator for Ukraine and Russia complies with
                                               
10 Additional indicators of dollarization used in the study are the following: DRCB
— the ratio of the sum of foreign currency deposits in the country and abroad to
the total deposits; DRM — the ratio of foreign currency deposits in the country to
the total deposits and national cash in circulation. Practical evidence shows that
these indicators are highly correlated.
11 Currently available data on foreign currency turnover are data on net pur-
chase/sale of foreign exchange by households provided in households' income
and expenditure statistics for Ukraine (starting from the third quarter of 1995).
The author thanks Andrew Verbetsky for data on net foreign cash turnover in Rus-
sia (starting from the beginning of 1995). In order to include those data in the
dollarization indicator, one should make an expert assumption of the size of the
initial amount of foreign currency in Ukraine and Russia. I used the expert estima-
tion of initial holding provided by Verbetsky and Friedman for Russia — $10 bil-
lions. I also assume that the initial amount of foreign currency in Ukraine equaled
$1 billion.
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its theoretical definition:
+
=
+ + +
f b
DR
f m b d
.
As a proxy for real relative return of domestic bonds
+= − +
*
1( )
e
t t t tRR i i e .
I use the difference of the weighted domestic currency deposit rate and
LIBOR on three-months deposits in U.S. dollar, taking into account ex-
pected devaluation (changes in average quarterly exchange rate of the
domestic currency to the U.S. dollar).12 I model three types of exchange
rate expectations:
• Static expectations (this is used for calculating the real relative re-
turn's variable RRSD):
+ =1
e
t te e ;
• Adaptive expectations (this is used for calculating the real relative
return, through variables RRSD and DRM(–1)):
λ λ+ = + −1 (1 )e et t te e e ;
• Perfect foresight (this is used for calculating the real relative return's
variable RRRD):
+ +=1 1
e
t te e .
Inflation volatility indicator 2S  (which corresponds to variable VCPI in the
econometric exercise) for quarterly data was calculated as a variance of
monthly inflation levels (taking monthly CPI data).
I used the following indicators of financial markets development:
• national currency loan and deposit rates spread (IRD variable);
                                               
12 A better definition is the difference of interest rates on domestic and foreign
currency deposits. However, even if published, these data are available only for a
shorter sample. For my proxy to be good, it is important that the dynamics of
LIBOR and interest rates on foreign currency deposits be similar. Unfortunately,
this condition does not always holds. For monthly 1996–2000 data on Poland, the
difference fluctuated less than 1 percentage point (website of Poland's Central
Bank), while in Ukraine in 1998–2000, the fluctuations reached 8 percentage
points (National Bank of Ukraine' Bulletin).
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• monetisation of GDP (MONET variable);
• external trade turnover (TT variable);
• external trade of goods balance (TBG variable);
• current account balance (CA variable).
3.3. Estimation Results
Tables A1 and A2 show Thomas' model estimation results of augmented
specification equations (10) and (11) including financial development in-
dicators. In particular, the estimated special case equation is as follows:
α β β β− = + + + +1 2 3log(1 ) log( ) log( )it i it it itDR RR VCPI FMDEV u . (12)
The general case equation is estimated in the following specification:
α β β β= + + + +1 2 3log logit i it it itDR RR VCPI FMDEV u . (13)
I present fixed-effects GLS estimates using unbalanced panel data.13
Specification (13) is estimated on a data set including 237 observations,
while specification (12) is estimated on a data set including 133 observa-
tions because of the restriction on the relative return indicator. The choice
of generalized least squares is explained by data heteroscedasticity. To
test for heteroscedasticity, I used the Breuch–Pagan test (Verbeek, 2000,
p. 85). For 237 observations with 4 degrees of freedom, the Chi-statistic
of null hypothesis equals 25.62. Since the value of the Chi-statistic ex-
ceeds the critical 5% significance value (9.48), I reject the null hypothesis
of the absence of heteroscedasticity. I chose the fixed-effects approach
because I assume that each country has characteristics which are not
captured by independent variables. In particular, one such characteristic
that follows from the theoretical model is attitude to risk. The extent of
time-invariant risk aversion should be captured by fixed-effects.14 In its
                                               
13 I checked the sensitivity of the results for Russia and Ukraine to changes in ex-
pert estimates of the original volume of foreign currency. Table A3 shows estima-
tion results for three cases: in addition to the basic assumption of USD 10mn for
Russia I also used USD 5 billions and USD 15 billions assumptions. For Ukraine,
besides the basic assumption of the original volume of USD 1 billions, I used USD
3 billions and USD 5 billions values.
14 In special case specification (12), fixed-effects show different attitudes to risk,
while in general case specification (13), they reflect different price volatility in
other countries (abroad). The notion of price dynamics "abroad" may differ for
each country because the structure of external economic relations is different (in
particular, trade).
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turn, risk aversion most likely depends on such factors as degree of cen-
tral bank independence and history of inflation dynamics. That is why we
expect different intercepts for different countries.
In both cases specification with adaptive expectations of exchange rate
change performed better. However, in the case of adaptive expectations,
the relative return indicator includes the current change of the exchange
rate that also influences the formation of the dependent DR variable
through the conversion of foreign currency deposits into units of national
currency. That is why for the current change of exchange rate in the
relative return indicator, I use exchange rate change in the next period
as an instrument.
In both specifications, national currency loan and deposit rate spread,
monetisation of GDP, external trade turnover and current account bal-
ance appear to be insignificant.
In the special case (12), lagged dollarization ratio and external trade bal-
ance have expected signs and 1% statistical significance, while relative
returns has 5% significance. Inflation volatility has the expected sign but
is insignificant even at the 10% significance level.
In general case (13), when the relative return enters the specification
not in logs but in levels, all indicators appeared to be significant and
had expected signs. The dollarization level exhibits high inertia; about
90% of its current value is determined by its past value. Short-term
elasticity of dollarization to inflation volatility constitutes 0.6. At the
same time, an increase in the relative return on assets in national
currency by 1% leads to 0.3% reduction in dollarization level. An in-
crease in the external trade balance by USD 100 mn leads to an in-
crease in the dollarization level on average by 0.02%. Since I esti-
mated the model with adaptive expectations, all corresponding long-
run effects are about 10 times (1/(1–0.9)) higher than the short-run
effects. In other words, the main part of the effect of parameter
change is revealed as time passes.15
In order to test the stability of parameters, I excluded outliers16 from the
sample and re-estimated equation (13). Estimation results presented in
Table A4 show that parameters remained practically unchanged. In other
                                               
15 In particular, recently in Russia and Ukraine, the exchange rate has been ex-
hibiting stability, and inflation has not been very volatile, but the dollarization level
has changed very slowly. The estimation results do not contradict these observa-
tions because they show that the long-run effect significantly exceeds the original
short-term effect.
16 I excluded 23 observations.
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words, the relationships are stable. Moreover, fixed effects appeared to
be even more significant.
At the same time, as Verbeek (2000, 327–333) noted, if there is a
lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side of the estimating
equation, then estimations are biased. I solve this problem with the
help of instrumental variables. I made an attempt to find instruments
among financial market development indicators that turned out to be
insignificant in regression (13). As one can see in Table A5, current
account balance (CA) and monetisation level of GDP (MONET) ap-
peared to be good instruments — their linear combination highly cor-
related with DR(–1) and simultaneously, they are practically uncorre-
lated with residuals of regression (13). Therefore, I estimate equation
(13) as follows:
α β β β β
=
= + + + + − +1 2 3 4
log
log ( 1)_ _ .
it
i it it it
DR
RR VCPI TBG DR IV FIT u
(14)
In comparison with the estimation without instrumental variables, the ef-
fect of inflation volatility and of instrument remained practically un-
changed. At the same time, the relative return coefficient almost dou-
bled, while the trade balance effect appeared to be two times lower. This
difference can be explained by the fact that equation (14) was estimated
on a smaller sample because of the shorter series available.17 Besides,
the impact of the trade balance became insignificant, but it is most likely
because it is highly collinear with the current account.
4. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The results imply the following conclusions. First, relative returns on as-
sets and inflation volatility are factors of dollarization in transition econo-
mies. Economic agents' choice of assets depends on their attractiveness
(their return and risk characteristics). This fact suggests that "internal"
(intra-country) mobility of capital between different currencies is high.
This result holds for countries with different monetary regimes: from
currency board (Lithuania) to direct inflation targeting (Czech Republic
and Poland).
Second, results of Thomas' model imply an alternative explanation of
hysteresis. According to the model, the rise of relative returns on do-
                                               
17 Romania was dropped, while the number of observations for Poland was sig-
nificantly reduced.
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mestic assets does not lead to a reduction in dollarization if it is accom-
panied with an increase in inflation volatility.18
Third, the estimation results imply the potential to fight dollarization
through the use of such instruments as high domestic interest rates, a
predictable exchange rate, and stability (not necessarily decline) of the
inflation rate.
Targeting high interest rates is not a preferred instrument of economic
(monetary) policy since (1) high interest rates may negatively affect the
real economy, and (2) high interest rates result in redistribution in the
dollarization structure towards currency substitution.
The predictability of the exchange rate and stability of the inflation rate
can also imply tradeoffs. For instance, if by predictability of the exchange
rate we mean its stability, and keep the exchange rate stable, it is quite
likely that it may result in higher inflation rate volatility. Therefore, infla-
tion targeting seems to be a more preferred instrument. In this case,
possible exchange rate fluctuations could have no adverse effects on the
relative return if financial markets are developed and interest rates re-
flect the exchange rate dynamics and expectations.
Fourth, the dollarization level in transition economies is not fully inde-
pendent of transaction motives that are implied from its relationship with
the external trade balance. This provides evidence of the relative under-
development of financial markets. Measures encouraging the develop-
ment of financial intermediation and increasing its efficiency will contrib-
ute to the weakening of this relationship. However, I failed to find a
statistically significant relationship between other indicators of financial
markets development and dollarization.
Fifth, the long-run effects of dollarization determinants by a significant
factor exceed the original short-run effects, thus it is vain to expect im-
mediate positive effects of policies targeting the reduction of the dollari-
zation level in the country.
                                               
18 The explanation of hysteresis by inflation volatility does not contradict the ex-
planation of this phenomenon related to an inactive band, fixed costs and network
effects. Quite the contrary, considering inflation volatility as a dollarization deter-
minant allows one to reduce the number of current "hesteresis" episodes, in
which one should explain asymmetry.
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Table À1. Thomas' Model Estimation Results by Generalized Least Squares: a
Special Case.
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-statistic Prob.
LOG(?VCPI) 0.005637 0.003690 1.527726 0.1292
LOG(?DR(–1)) 0.890446 0.028343 31.41673 0.0000
LOG(?RRRD) –0.010519 0.004922 –2.137006 0.0346
?TBG 4.36E–06 1.46E–06 2.998574 0.0033
Fixed Effects
POL_--C –0.166479
RUS_--C –0.291908
ROM_--C –0.127078
UKR_--C –0.124637
LAT_--C –0.110821
LIT_--C –0.097633
CZE_--C –0.304665
CRO_--C –0.043013
SLO_--C –0.103150
Weighted statistics
R-squared 0.986928   Mean dependent var –1.408326
Adjusted R-squared 0.985621   S.D. dependent var 0.671723
S.E. of regression 0.080549   Sum squared resid 0.778578
Log likelihood 176.6411   F-statistic 3019.934
Durbin–Watson stat. 2.221928   Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Unweighted statistics
R-squared 0.975439   Mean dependent var –1.156219
Adjusted R-squared 0.972983   S.D. dependent var 0.495146
S.E. of regression 0.081386   Sum squared resid 0.794847
Durbin–Watson stat. 2.453607
Dependent variable: LOG(?DR);
Method: GLS (Cross Section Weights);
Sample: 1992:1–2000:4;
Included observations: 34;
Number of cross-sections used: 9;
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 133.
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Table À2. Thomas' Model Estimation Results by Generalized Least Squares: a
General Case.
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-statistic Prob.
LOG(?VCPI) 0.006302 0.001626 3.876992 0.0001
LOG(?DR(–1)) 0.920800 0.021911 42.02362 0.0000
?RRRD –0.002911 0.000385 –7.558041 0.0000
?TBG 2.64E–06 1.04E–06 2.541863 0.0117
Fixed effects
POL_--C –0.110739
RUS_--C –0.182827
ROM_--C –0.094978
UKR_--C –0.069625
LAT_--C –0.084332
LIT_--C –0.054488
CZE_--C –0.200502
CRO_--C –0.026524
SLO_--C –0.073136
Weighted statistics
R-squared 0.984522   Mean dependent var –1.348747
Adjusted R-squared 0.983693   S.D. dependent var 0.604033
S.E. of regression 0.077135   Sum squared resid 1.332766
Log likelihood 323.6722   F-statistic 4749.314
Durbin–Watson stat. 1.892914   Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Unweighted statistics
R-squared 0.981115   Mean dependent var –1.143093
Adjusted R-squared 0.980103   S.D. dependent var 0.548889
S.E. of regression 0.077424   Sum squared resid 1.342747
Durbin–Watson stat. 2.092270
Dependent Variable: LOG(?DR);
Method: GLS (Cross Section Weights);
Sample: 1992:1–2000:4;
Included observations: 36
Number of cross-sections used: 9;
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 237.
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Table À3. Analysis of Results' Sensitivity to Experts' Estimation of Initial Foreign
Currency Holdings in Russia.
Russia, $10 mn Russia, $5 mn Russia, $15 mn
coef prob coef prob coef prob
C –0.18682 0.1505 –0.23024 0.1456 –0.15755 0.1709
LOG(VCPI) 0.023881 0.0135 0.024904 0.0263 0.022613 0.0086
LOG(DR(–1)) 0.872324 0 0.862696 0.0002 0.871476 0
RRRD –0.00318 0.0101 –3.28E–03 0.0281 –0.00301 0.0051
TBG 1.90E–06 0.7205 2.31E–06 0.7004 1.44E–06 0.7607
R-squared 0.857946  0.799328 0.886111  
Adjusted R-squared 0.824522  0.752112 0.859313  
S.E. of regression 0.074199  0.087442 0.065246  
Sum squared resid 0.093594  0.129984 0.07237  
Log likelihood 28.84152  25.22863 31.67048  
Durbin–Watson stat. 2.280829  2.232978 2.310208  
Table À4. Estimation Results by Generalized Least Squares for the Full Sample
and Without Outliers.
pool, 237 obs. pool_no outliers, 214 obs.
coef prob coef prob
LOG(VCPI) 0.006302 0.0001 0.005831 0.0002
LOG(DR(–1)) 0.9208 0 0.894537 0
RRRD –0.00291 0 –0.00404 0
TBG 2.64E–06 0.0117 2.84E–06 0.0073
POL_--C –0.11074 0.0007 –0.15159 0
ROM_--C –0.09498 0.0246 –0.12293 0.0033
UKR_--C –0.06963 0.0152 –0.09804 0.0004
LAT_--C –0.08433 0.0094 –0.11481 0.0002
LIT_--C –0.05449 0.0198 –0.07052 0.002
CZE_--C –0.20050 0.0014 –0.26641 0
CRO_--C –0.02652 0.022 –0.04007 0.0004
SLO_--C –0.07314 0.0032 –0.11953 0
RUS_--C –0.18283 0.0007 –0.21838 0
R-squared 0.984522  0.988831  
Adjusted R-squared 0.983693  0.988165  
S.E. of regression 0.077135  0.075046  
Log likelihood 323.6722  312.6275  
Durbin–Watson stat. 1.892914  1.892468  
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Table À5. Estimation Results by Generalized Least Squares for Specification with
Instrumental Variables. Method: GLS (Cross Section Weights)
Coef Prob
LOG(?VCPI) 0.007197 0
?DR(–1)_IV_FIT 0.863161 0
?RRRD –3.83E–03 0
?TBG 1.25E–06 0.1553
Fixed Effects
POL_--C –2.20E–01 0
RUS_--C –0.188454 0.0002
UKR_--C –0.114892 0.0001
LAT_--C –0.149786 0
LIT_--C –0.103714 0.0003
CZE_--C –0.314599 0
CRO_--C –0.049038 0.0002
SLO_--C –0.143082 0
R-squared 0.986148
Adjusted R-squared 0.985011
S.E. of regression 0.073224
Durbin–Watson stat. 2.104011  
Dependent Variable: LOG(?DR); Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 146.
Coef Prob
C
?CA 2.89E–05 0
?MONET 0.000322 0
R-squared 0.959823
Adjusted R-squared 0.957258
S.E. of regression 0.174669
Log likelihood 95.65647
Durbin–Watson stat. 0.49945
Dependent Variable: LOG(?DR(–1)); Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 151.
Coef Prob
?CA –4.45E–06 0.0767
?MONET –1.50E–05 0.6084
R-squared 0.051914
Adjusted R-squared –0.010827
S.E. of regression 0.074162
Log likelihood 207.9352
Durbin–Watson stat. 2.228009  
Dependent Variable: RESID? Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 146.
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